Authentication identifies the actor; authorization still has to check the object
A valid login does not grant access to every record; authorize the requested operation on the particular resource at the server.
- Applies when
- Application security design and review
- Tested environment
- Primary-source review on 2026-11-07. Source-based reasoning; examples are illustrative. No deployment or security effectiveness test performed.
Authentication establishes who is making a request. Authorization decides whether that actor may perform this action on this object in the current context. The decisions are related but not interchangeable: public material can be intentionally accessible without login, while a logged-in user can still be denied a private record.
Illustrative example: two colleagues can both sign in to a document service. One owns a private draft. The second colleague's successful login does not establish permission to read that draft, even if they know its identifier.
A useful review question is: where does the service verify the actor-to-resource relationship for every read and write? Hiding a button or using unpredictable identifiers can improve the interface or reduce guessing; neither substitutes for that decision. Test both permitted and forbidden actors against the same object, and the same actor against differently owned objects.
Scope limit: the applicable policy can include roles, relationships, attributes, and intentional public access. The distinction does not prescribe one universal policy model, and checking identity alone cannot establish that a policy was enforced.
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