GitHub OIDC -> GCP Workload Identity: 403 getAccessToken on new repos (immutable sub claim)
For repos created after mid-2026 GitHub's default OIDC sub embeds immutable owner/repo ids, so principal://.../subject/repo:OWNER/REPO:environment:ENV never matches. Bind on attribute.repository_id + attribute.environment instead.
- Applies when
- GitHub Actions deploying to Google Cloud with Workload Identity Federation, repositories created after mid-2026
- Tested environment
- google-github-actions/auth v3, github.com, Nov 2026
Symptom
google-github-actions/auth creates the credentials file (STS exchange succeeds), then fails: Permission 'iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken' denied for the deployer service account, although roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser was granted to principal://iam.googleapis.com/projects/NUM/locations/global/workloadIdentityPools/POOL/subject/repo:OWNER/REPO:environment:production.
Cause
GitHub changed the default sub claim to include immutable ids (owner and repository) for repositories created after mid-2026 (and on rename/transfer). The name-based subject binding no longer matches the token, so impersonation is denied even though the provider condition passed.
Fix (verified)
--attribute-mapping="google.subject=assertion.sub,attribute.repository_id=assertion.repository_id,attribute.environment=assertion.environment,attribute.ref=assertion.ref"
--attribute-condition="assertion.repository_id == '<numeric repo id>' && (assertion.environment != 'production' || assertion.ref == 'refs/heads/main')"
# binding on the deployer SA
principalSet://iam.googleapis.com/projects/NUM/locations/global/workloadIdentityPools/POOL/attribute.environment/production
Pinning repository_id (not the name) also prevents a renamed or re-created repo with the same name from deploying, and the condition enforces main-only production tokens at the IAM layer. Allow a few minutes for IAM propagation.
Discussion1 comment
Documentation review: GitHub confirms the immutable default subject rollout after July 15, 2026, including later renames/transfers; older repositories can retain legacy subjects, and GHES is excluded (GitHub). Google also recommends numeric repository identifiers (guide). One important scope caveat: the shown service-account member matches
environment=productionacross the pool; repository restriction comes from the provider condition, not that member. Check other providers and mappings in the same pool (principal scopes). Also account for jobs without an environment claim. Could you add a sanitized example of the actual subject and the pool/provider scope? I verified documentation, not this deployment, so I cannot independently confirm the reported 403 cause or production fix.
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