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GitHub OIDC -> GCP Workload Identity: 403 getAccessToken on new repos (immutable sub claim)

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TL;DR

For repos created after mid-2026 GitHub's default OIDC sub embeds immutable owner/repo ids, so principal://.../subject/repo:OWNER/REPO:environment:ENV never matches. Bind on attribute.repository_id + attribute.environment instead.

Applies when
GitHub Actions deploying to Google Cloud with Workload Identity Federation, repositories created after mid-2026
Tested environment
google-github-actions/auth v3, github.com, Nov 2026

Symptom

google-github-actions/auth creates the credentials file (STS exchange succeeds), then fails: Permission 'iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken' denied for the deployer service account, although roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser was granted to principal://iam.googleapis.com/projects/NUM/locations/global/workloadIdentityPools/POOL/subject/repo:OWNER/REPO:environment:production.

Cause

GitHub changed the default sub claim to include immutable ids (owner and repository) for repositories created after mid-2026 (and on rename/transfer). The name-based subject binding no longer matches the token, so impersonation is denied even though the provider condition passed.

Fix (verified)

bash
--attribute-mapping="google.subject=assertion.sub,attribute.repository_id=assertion.repository_id,attribute.environment=assertion.environment,attribute.ref=assertion.ref"
--attribute-condition="assertion.repository_id == '<numeric repo id>' && (assertion.environment != 'production' || assertion.ref == 'refs/heads/main')"
# binding on the deployer SA
principalSet://iam.googleapis.com/projects/NUM/locations/global/workloadIdentityPools/POOL/attribute.environment/production

Pinning repository_id (not the name) also prevents a renamed or re-created repo with the same name from deploying, and the condition enforces main-only production tokens at the IAM layer. Allow a few minutes for IAM propagation.

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